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EXTINGUISHING EXCLUSIVE MARKETING
RIGHTS:
INTERPRETING THE MEDICAL INNOVATION
PRIZE FUND ACT OF 2011
1. INTRODUCTION
$2.5 trillion.' That was the amount spent in the United States on
health care in 2009.2 For that year, this spending translated into
17.6 percent of gross domestic product, even though it was the
slowest annual increase in spending seen in decades.' $249.9
billion, approximately 10 percent of the total, was spent on
prescription drugs.4 As with overall health spending, the amount
spent on prescription drugs actually decreased, and has been
decreasing since the implementation of Medicare Part D, dropping
from 18 percent growth in 1999 to 3 percent growth in 2008.6
Despite the recent slow-down in spending, attributable partially to
the recession of 2008,' forecasts for health expenditures are
projected to increase to $4.6 trillion by the year 2020. The impact
of high prescription prices is readily observed, be it the consumer
who cannot afford needed medications, or the employer who
avoids hiring workers with pre-existing medical needs.'
1. Anne Martin, David Lassman, Lekha Whittle, Aaron Catlin, Recession
Contributes to Slowest Annual Rate of Increase in Health Spending in Five
Decades, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 11, 11 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 12 ex. 1.
5. Medicare Part D provides outpatient prescription drug coverage to those
over the age of 65. Susan A. Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for
U.S. Health Policy? 14 ELDER L.J. 237, 238-39 (2006).
6. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 1-2 (2010).
7. Martin, supra note 1, at II.
8. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY,
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES PROJECTIONS 2010-2020 (2011).
9. James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prize for Innovation of New Medicines and
Vaccines, 18 ANN. HEALTH L. 155, 157 (2009).
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So why are health care costs so high in the United States?
Compared to other developed countries, the U.S. health care
consumer spends considerably more.'o Experts attribute this to an
increased role of non-US governments in negotiating drug prices
or imposing other measures of price controls." For example, in
Canada, the government requires compulsory licensing of all
patented drugs to generic manufactures, thus allowing for
drastically reduced prescription drug costs. 2 Germany utilizes a
different strategy: the government acts as a monopoly insurer,
dictating the maximum amount of reimbursement. 3 The United
Kingdom relies on the "quality-adjusted life year" (QALY) to
determine whether a new drug provides value in addition to
efficacy.14 To implement QALY, the cost of a treatment is divided
by the QALY score, which is then used as the price ceiling."
In the United States, while the government does play a role in
negotiating prices, it leaves much of the pricing structure to the
free market. 6 Because of the current system of exclusivities
granted by both the patent system and the FDA, pricing for
patented drugs is not necessarily based on competitive market
prices, but on monopoly pricing power." In effect, because
governments in other countries limit prices but not in the United
10. Jonathan Ingram, Eliminating Innovation, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 115, 118
(2011).
11. Id. at 116.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. QALY scores are rated from zero to one, with zero equaling death, and
one equaling perfect health. Seth D. Knocke, Incentivizing Innovation:
Pharmaceutical Pricing in the United States and the United Kingdom, 20
Annals Health L. Advance Directive 177, 182-83 (2011).
15. Id.
16. See Channick, supra note 5, at 253-54. The government does reimburse
drug suppliers through Medicare and Medicaid insurance plans and controls
pricing to some degree. Id. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services
determines the price for covered drugs, and reimburses suppliers based on those
determinations under Medicare parts A and B. Id. However, in Medicare Part
D prescription plans, the preferred providers directly negotiate prices with the
pharmaceutical suppliers, rather than having government set prices. Id.
17. James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for
New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1519, 1522 (2007).
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States, companies are able to charge higher prices in the United
States to offset those limits-a form of price discrimination."
In order to address these problems, Senator Sanders offers a
potential solution: The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of
2011.19 In the Bill, Senator Sanders proposes implementing a
prize-based system of incentives, with the first company receiving
FDA-approval for a drug collecting a substantial financial prize in
lieu of market exclusivity. 20  Simply stated, the incentive
mechanism would be prize-based rather than exclusivity-based,
with prize awards replacing post-FDA approval exclusivities. 2 1
Thus, the primary goal of the Bill is to de-couple R&D costs from
the final price of a prescription drug, with the prize serving as the
mechanism to cover R&D costs, rather than the patient paying
supra-competitive prices.22
However, as written, the Bill makes concessions to the current
patent- and FDA-granted exclusivities. 23  These concessions
weaken its impact considerably, and muddle its practical
implementation. Additionally, the Bill fails to specify whether it
would be a voluntary or non-voluntary system.24 That is, would
the Bill compel a company to forego post-FDA approval
exclusivity, or could the company opt for the prize instead of
exclusive rights? Of course, either route creates its own problems.
If the Bill were mandatory, then how would a company be
compelled to freely share its invention? If the Bill were voluntary,
then why would a company opt for the prize when monopoly
pricing could generate potentially higher profits? To be truly
18. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1548. Price discrimination is the
practice of charging different prices to different consumer group based on what
each group can pay. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and
Costs of the Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals? 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
75, 112-13 (2004).
19. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong.
(2011).
20. Id. § 9.
21. See id. §§ 2, 5, 6.
22. Id. § 2.
23. Id. § 5.
24. See id. §§ 5, 9 (neither section describes if a company must compete for a
prize, or if it may compete if desired).
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effective, the Bill needs to clearly define how it would operate in
light of its exceptions to patent and FDA-granted exclusivity.
Further, the Bill needs to clarify whether the prize system is
mandatory or voluntary.
Part II of this note will begin by exploring the traditional
rationales for the patent system as a means of inducing innovation,
as well as the practical manifestation of those underlying
rationales. Part II will also introduce the basic rationale behind the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
("Hatch-Waxman") and its relation to the proposed Bill. Part III
addresses the Bill itself, describing the content of the proposed
legislation, as well as an initial assessment of its usefulness. Part
IV provides an analysis of the Bill's substantive proposals.
Specifically, the analysis will first focus on the proponents and
opponents of the Bill. Next, the analysis will focus on the
theoretical impact of a prize system of incentives, and the
limitations of theory when it comes to reality. Part IV ends with
suggestions for improving the Bill, including recommendations on
how to effectively implement the Bill's provisions. Part V
concludes this note.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Patent System
The patent system is supposed to promote progress and
stimulate innovation, with its underlying rationale enshrined in the
Constitution itself: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries . . . ."2 As the rationale
goes, by affording an inventor the right to exclude others from
practicing his invention (i.e. effectively a monopoly), the inventor
is able to reap the financial rewards of his invention without
worrying about possibly better positioned competitors." The
25. U.S. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 8.
26. Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual
Property's Downside, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 922 (2010); Gifford, supra note
18, at 81.
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prospect of a monopoly serves as a powerful incentive to innovate
in the first place.2 7 If an inventor knew his product could readily
be co-opted by a competitor, then the inventor would have little
financial incentive to spend the time and money necessary to
develop any truly ground-breaking inventions.28 With exclusivity
in place, however, the inventor now has a financial incentive to
engage in such expensive and time-consuming research and
development.29
Moreover, in exchange for the limited period of exclusivity,
patent laws provide a mechanism to ensure that society also
benefits: the requirement of disclosure.30 The quid pro quo is the
inventor gets exclusive rights for a period of time. In exchange,
the inventor must also disclose exactly what the invention is, and
how to use the invention, information which then enters the public
domain when the patent expires." Thus, both the inventor and the
public benefit, with the inventor profiting from his creativity, and
the public eventually improving on the invention, and continuing
the cycle of innovation and progress.32
Apart from the traditional notions of promoting innovation and
discovery through the lure of monopoly, there is also the prospect
theory of patents.33 "Prospect" patents are broad patents issued in
the very early stages of technical development. Because these
products are not yet fully developed, traditional patent
justifications dictate that these products do not receive protection.3 4
However, granting patents on these products is still socially
beneficial because the patent provides "an incentive to make
27. Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science,
114 YALE L.J. 659, 670 (2004).
28. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 922.
29. Lee, supra note 27, at 661; Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 926-27.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). This section has not been substantively altered
by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) [hereinafter "AIA"].
3 1. Id.
32. Lee, supra note 27, at 670.
33. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
34. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 440 (2004).
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investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that
the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information
appropriable by competitors."3 ' Thus, under the prospect theory,
the function of the patent system is to encourage investment in a
technological prospect after the property right has been granted,
akin to the granting of prospective mineral rights.3 6 In terms of
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology products, this incentive to
continue developing medical treatments is critical owing to the
high costs of developing these treatments from start to finish.
Industry groups report that it costs roughly $800 million to
develop a new drug.38 A follow-up study suggests that
development costs are roughly $1.2 billion. Under the
pharmaceutical industry's rationale, it is these costs that justify the
high prices seen in prescription drugs.4 0 The final price reflects not
only the R&D costs of the drug itself, but also the costs of all other
failed drugs.4' Considering that only approximately 8 percent of
possible drug candidates actually receive FDA approval and reach
the market, the costs of developing drugs that ultimately fail can
35. Kitch, supra note 33, at 276.
36. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REv. 1575, 1600-03 (2003). In granting mineral rights, the minerals have not
been discovered yet-there is merely the prospect of finding them. Thus, giving
exclusive ownership rights provides an incentive to invest in the hunt since the
owner knows a competitor cannot claim ownership once the minerals have been
found. See id. Additionally, because it is an investment, there is a built-in
incentive to allocate resources in the most efficient manner possible. See id.
37. Id. at 1616.
38. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, Henry G. Grabowski, The Price
oflnnovation: New Estimates ofDrug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON.
151, 180 (2003). There has been some criticism leveled at the fact that the study
was supported by pharmaceutical companies, and that as standard practice, these
companies make it very difficult to determine actual development costs. See
Timothy Noah, The Make-Believe Billion: How Drug Companies Exaggerate
Research Costs to Justify Absurd Profits, SLATE (March 3, 2011, 9:19 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2287227/pagenum/all/#p2.
39. Christopher P. Adams and Van V. Brantner, Spending on New Drug
Development, 19 J. HEALTH ECoN. 130, 141 (2010).
40. Id. at 131.
41. Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for A Public Goods
Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2009).
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reach staggering numbers.42 Due to the high initial investment and
failure costs involved in drug development, there would be little to
no incentive to develop drugs at all if the patent-granted
exclusivity ceased to exist.43 Further, because other countries limit
the price of drugs, pharmaceutical companies must be able to
charge higher prices somewhere to recoup development costs.44
Because the Unites States allows for monopoly pricing, these
companies can charge those higher prices, recoup R&D costs, and
ultimately continue investigations into innovative new products.4 5
Additional support for the patent system to promote innovation
comes from the relative ease of reproducing the patented product.46
In the field of small molecular entities (e.g. common
pharmaceuticals like aspirin), competitors can relatively easily
duplicate a drug once it is publically available after the patent has
expired.47 Indeed, the number of generics entering the market once
a drug loses patent protection, and the speed with which they enter,
bolsters this notion: competition begins to appear in as little as one
to two months post-patent expiration.48 Moreover, because the
generics need not go through the same lengthy review process
required by the FDA, nor engage in the initial R&D, the final costs
for producing the generic equivalent are quite low.49 In the
absence of patent protection, and faced with low-cost generic
competition, a pioneer company would have a difficult time
capturing the market share needed to recoup costs if it could only
42. Richard A. Epstein, Branded Versus Generic Competition? A Kind Word
for the Branded Drugs. 3 HASTINGS Sci. & TECH. L.J. 459, 463 (2011) (noting 8
percent FDA approval in more recent years).
43. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 922.
44. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 116; Knocke, supra note 14, at 182-83.
45. See Adams & Brantner, supra note 39, at 13 1.
46. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM
GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 3 (1998) [hereinafter "CBO REPORT"].
47. Id. See Chester G. Moore, Generic Biologic Drugs What's in A Name?,
5 ABA SciTECH LAW. 16, 16 (2008) (noting that small molecule drugs are
structurally simple, making synthesis simpler).
48. CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 39 tbl.7.
49. Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1616-17.
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charge competitive prices."o The result: little incentive to design
new drugs without some form of exclusivity protection.51
B. Critiquing the Patent System
Ideally, exclusivity serves as the primary economic driving force
behind innovation in many commercial sectors.52 For
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, patents and FDA-
granted exclusivity provide assurances that these companies can
charge the prices necessary to recover research and development
(R&D) costs.53
Yet, there are numerous downsides associated with exclusivity,
particularly in the field of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.5 4
From a purely economic standpoint, monopolies are inefficient. A
monopoly skews the pure competitive supply and demand
dynamic, allowing a company to charge higher prices than the
market would normally support." Because of this higher pricing,
there will inevitably be a portion of the population that needs the
product but simply cannot afford it, or is unwilling to pay such a
high price." Thus, both the consumer loses out on a needed good,
and the producer loses potential sales. In economic terms, this is
known as deadweight loss." While price discrimination is one
way of mitigating such deadweight loss, in practice, discrimination
is typically inefficient and results in an inexact allocation of
50. By pioneer, the author means companies making brand new, first-of-its-
kind products.
51. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 926-27.
52. See Lee, supra note 27, at 670.
53. See Overview of the Patent System, supra Section 11(A); Cotropia &
Gibson, supra note 26, at 926-27.
54. See generally Gifford, supra note 18; Love & Hubbard, supra note 9;
Love & Hubbard, supra note 17; Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26; Lee, supra
note 27; Burk & Lemley, supra note 36.
55. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 928.
56. Id. at 928-29.
57. Id.; estimates of the impact of such inefficiencies range from $3 billion to
$30 billion in the United States alone. Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace
Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 25, 27 (2007).
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costs." As a result, pharmaceutical companies in the United States
continue to charge monopoly prices to both consumers who can
afford such prices and consumers who cannot.59
A phenomenon closely tied to economic inefficiency is the
incentive to develop, and patent, minimally improved versions of
pre-existing products."o This essentially extends the life of the pre-
existing product, but offers only a minimal benefit to the end-user
while having the same high cost.6' Because demand for
pharmaceutical and biotechnology products typically are
necessities, a company providing such products can continue to
develop minimally improved versions and offer it at the same
price. Provided the consumer perceives that there is still ample
benefit from the new version, the consumer will still purchase it at
that price.62
Some of the additional criticisms are more conceptually straight-
forward. One of the problems the Bill seeks to address is the lack
of R&D targeting neglected diseases, such as those afflicting
predominantly the poor, or afflicting smaller numbers of people.63
This lack of development arises simply because the costs of
developing and manufacturing a treatment are far higher than
potential revenue.64 If a company cannot recover its costs, let
58. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1548-49. See Gifford, supra note 18,
at 112-113.
59. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1548-49.
60. See Linda P. Nussbaum & John D. Radice, Where Do We Go Now? The
Hatch-Waxman Act Twenty-Five Years Later: Successes, Failures, and
Prescriptions for the Future, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 229, 249 (2009).
61. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1523.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1527-28. Diseases primarily afflicting the poor would include
malaria, tuberculosis, and Chagas' disease, among others. See Meghan
Hamilton-Piercy, Book Note, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2005-2006) (reviewing
MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING
INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES
(2004)). Small afflicted populations would be populations of less than 200,000
people in the United States. See Developing Products for Rare Diseases &
Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last visited Oct. 23, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/de
fault.htm.
64. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 922.
19 1
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alone turn a profit, then there is little incentive to pursue that
market."5
Lastly, there is the issue of the "anticommons.""6 When there
are too many patents in a particular field, these patents will
potentially disrupt or even prevent further innovation.6 7 This is
particularly important in the biotechnology industry, where there is
a great deal of basic scientific research utilized in developing a
medical product.68 If there are too many patents on "upstream"
research tools, then "downstream" innovation can be hampered."
Senator Sanders' proposed Bill offers a potentially simple
solution to many of these systemic weaknesses, and will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV."o
C. Hatch- Waxman: Generic Competition and Impact on Pricing
Even in the 1980s, law-makers were aware of the seemingly
relentless increase in the cost of prescription drugs." The passage
of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 emerged as a compromise between the pioneer drug
companies and the generic manufacturers.72 As noted by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Hatch-Waxman had to balance
65. Id.
66. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621
(1998).
67. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699
(1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/698.full.pdf.
68. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 699.
69. Lee, supra note 27, at 674. "Upstream" refers to basic research tools and
products which are used to develop the actual finished, or "downstream,"
products. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 698.
70. See generally Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th
Cong. (2011).
71. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.D.C. 1990)).
72. Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 60, at 233; see Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156,
271, 282 (2006)) [hereinafter "Hatch-Waxman"].
192
10
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss1/6
2011] MEDICAL INNOVATION PRIZE FUND ACT
two conflicting policy objectives: "to induce brand name
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to
research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those
drugs to market." 3  On one hand, the pioneer companies were
complaining that the lengthy FDA approval process was eroding
the effective life of their patents by upwards of five years.74 If
there is insufficient time to sell a drug exclusively, then the cost of
R&D cannot be recouped, resulting in a loss of incentive to
actually develop such new compounds." On the other hand, FDA
regulations required that generic drugs undergo the same lengthy
safety and efficacy trials that the pioneer drugs had to endure,
presenting a formidable barrier to entry owing to the added costs
of such studies." Moreover, from the viewpoint of the generic
manufacturers, the law effectively increased a pioneer's patent by
several years, as the generic had to wait until after the patent
expired before even beginning investigations of generic versions.7
Hatch-Waxman's compromise involved two major provisions."
The first provision allowed a patented drug to extend its term for
up to five years, based on the length of time between filing an
Investigational New Drug (IND) application and submission of a
New Drug Application (NDA), provided that the applicant acted
with due diligence prior to the patent's expiration.7 9 In addition to
patent term extensions, the bill also provided for a period of post-
approval exclusivity." For New Chemical Entities (NCE), the
holder of the approved NCE would be entitled to five years of
73. Mylan Pharms., 268 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920
F.2d 984, 991 (D.D.C. 1990)).
74. Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 60, at 233.
75. Id. at 233-34.
76. Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 60, at 233.
77. Id. at 234.
78. See Elizabeth S. Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch- Waxman Act:
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590 (2003).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); Hatch-Waxman, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984). Patent term extensions have not been modified by the AIA.
See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
80. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 592.
193
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market exclusivity, during which time no one can utilize its safety
and efficacy data.'
The second provision covered generic competition by providing
an accelerated approval process, known as the Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA).8 2 Instead of going through
independent clinical trials to show safety and efficacy, the generic
drug need only show that it was the bioequivalent of the FDA-
approved original, resulting in significantly reduced up-front
investment costs." Upon this showing, the generic could then rely
on the original product's safety and efficacy data.84 However, in
order to gain market approval, the generic still could not infringe
on a pioneer's patent: rather, the generic manufacturer had to
certify that (1) no patent existed for the drug; (2) the relevant
patent had expired; (3) the generic would wait for the relevant
patent to expire; or (4) allege that the relevant patent is invalid or
not infringed." While options one through three were relatively
straight-forward, option four ("Paragraph IV") was markedly more
complicated.86 Upon Paragraph IV certification, the generic maker
must notify the pioneer of the certification, after which the pioneer
has forty-five days to bring an infringement suit against the
generic maker." The FDA would then grant a thirty-month period
during which the generic would not be approved once the pioneer
81. Hatch-Waxman §§ 101, 103. A new chemical entity means a drug that
contains no active moiety that has been approved by FDA. Small Business
Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product Exclusivity, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
82. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 593.
83. Id. at 594. For bioequivalence, the generic had to show that its
bioavailability (e.g. rate of absorption into the blood stream) was the same as the
pioneer. See Hatch-Waxman § 101.
84. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 593; Hatch-Waxman § 101.
85. Hatch-Waxman § 101.
86. This Update will not address the issue of Paragraph IV certification, as
the proposed legislation does not necessarily address these issues. The reader is
directed to the relevant case law: In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifene Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056
(11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.
2003).
87. Hatch-Waxman § 101.
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initiated an infringement suit." Considering the expense involved
in infringement litigation, Hatch-Waxman also provided a 180-day
exclusivity period to the generic manufacturer, during which time
the FDA would not approve any competing versions provided the
generic manufacturer prevailed." This served as an incentive for
the generic maker to incur the costs of litigation.o
Prior to passage of Hatch-Waxman in 1984, only 35 percent of
top-selling drugs off-patent had generic versions available on the
market. 9' In 1998, nearly all off-patent drugs had at least one
generic version on the market.9 2 Further, prior to passage, generic
manufacturers accounted for only 13 percent of prescription drug
sales, whereas a decade later, generics accounted for almost 60
percent of all drug sales."
For a specific example, take Zantac, the popular heartburn
medication. GlaxoSmithKline first launched Zantac in 1983, and
the first generic gained approval and market entry in 1997.94 After
only one year, the number of generic versions of Zantac grew to
thirteen, with the generic versions accounting for 75 percent of the
market. 95 Moreover, the average price of the generic versions were
only 30 percent of the brand name price, contributing to the loss of
market share experienced by the brand name drug.96 By most
accounts, the implementation of Hatch-Waxman had the intended
effect in terms of promoting generic drug development, and
driving down the price of prescription drugs.
88. Id.
89. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 603 (as the authors note, this
provision has created its own interpretation problems-e.g. when does the 180
day period begin? At the time of marketing? After a decision has been
rendered?); Hatch-Waxman § 101.
90. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 603.
91. CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 37.
92. Id.
93. CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 37.
94. Atanu Saha, Henry Grabowski, Howard Birnbaum, Paul Greenberg,
Oded Bizan, Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 INT. J.
ECON. Bus. 15, 22 tbl.1 (2006).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 17-18.
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III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Medical Innovation Prize Act, House Bill 417 (2005), and
Senate Bill 2210 (2007)
In 2005, then Representative Bernie Sanders introduced his first
Medical Innovation Prize bill.9 8 In it, Sanders cited Congressional
findings that (1) prescription drug prices were increasing at a rate
of over 7 percent per year between 1993 and 2003; (2) uninsured
persons were foregoing medications because of the high cost; (3)
many new drugs approved by the FDA failed to offer significant
improvements over existing drugs in terms of efficacy; and (4)
many diseases remained neglected due to lack of financial
incentives.99 Ultimately, the 2005 measure failed to reach the
House floor for voting.o As a Senator in 2007, Sanders
introduced a similar measure in the Senate, Senate Bill 2210,
which mirrored his earlier effort almost exactly, noting the high
price of prescription drugs and the lack of incentives to develop
truly innovative drugs.'O' The 2007 version failed to reach the
Senate floor for voting.10 2
B. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, Senate Bill 1137
The current Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, Senate
Bill 1137, again mirrors the core elements of both previous failed
versions, but emphasizes the reward mechanisms of the current
system, including the legally granted market exclusivities of
patents and FDA-approval.'03 As of May 26, 2011, the Bill was
read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Health,
98. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005).
99. Id. § 2.
100. Bill Summary & Status, 109th Cong, H.R. 417, LIBRARY OF CONG. (last
visited Oct. 27, 2011), http://hdL.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.109hr417.
101. Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. (2007).
102. Bill Summary & Status, 110th Cong, S. 2210, LIBRARY OF CONG. (last
visited Oct. 27, 2011), http://hdl.1oc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.110s22 10.
103. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong.
(2011).
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Education, Labor and Pensions.'" No further action has been
taken.'
Section Two of the Bill outlines the findings leading to the
creation of the Bill, noting the flaws of the current system.' In
particular, this section notes that the current system of exclusivities
is both expensive and inefficient.'17  Additionally, Section Two
stresses the need to "de-link" R&D costs from the final price of
products, noting that such a process could result in substantial cost
savings to the end consumer.'" Section Two also introduces the
prize fund's size as being 0.55 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) of the United States-a sum of approximately $80 billion
in 2011.'9 Lastly, this section emphasizes the importance of
information sharing, noting that "[t]he development of new
medicines benefits from greater sharing of knowledge, data,
materials, and technologies.""o In recognition of the importance
of such sharing, the Bill would allocate 5 percent of the prize fund
"to those who provide open access" to critical information and
materials."'
Section Three defines the Bill's purpose, and is closely related
to the findings made in Section Two:
It is the purpose of this Act to provide incentives to
encourage entities to invest in research and
development of new medicines and to share
knowledge, data, materials, and technology,
through the establishment of a Medical Innovation
Prize Fund, while enhancing access to such
medicines by eliminating legal monopolies on the
104. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Cong, S. 1137, LIBRARY OF CONG. (last
visited Oct. 27, 2011), http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.l 12s 1137.
105. Id.
106. S. 1137 § 2.
107. Id. § 2(2).
108. Id. § 2(3).
109. Id. § 2(4).
110. S. 1137 § 2(5).
111. Id. § 2(6).
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manufacture, distribution, and sale of such
medicines.112
Section Four defines the various terms used throughout the bill,
including definitions for "biological product" and "drug" as
defined in section 351 of the Public Health Service Act and section
201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, respectively." 3
Section Five is entitled "Elimination of Exclusive Rights to
Market Drugs and Biological Product" and represents one of the
core provisions of the Bill."4 Specifically, this section provides
additional details regarding the elimination of exclusivities and the
mechanism of prize payouts."'5  Because of the exclusivities
provided by both the patent laws and FDA regulations, drug
companies have little incentive to develop truly ground-breaking
new medicines, relying rather on "me-too" versions which can
extend the monopoly provided by patents and thus justify
continuing high prices for drugs that offer incremental
improvement over its predecessor."6 As commentators note:
The prescription drug industry lacks the price
discipline present in most industries because of its
tripartite nature in which the drivers of demand
(physicians) are largely insulated from the
economic purchasers (government or private health
plans). In most industries, an incremental
improvement would justify only an incremental
change in price.. . . Drug manufacturers [however]
. . . are able to maintain market share while
launching line extensions that offer only minimal
benefits over older, now-generic versions even
112. Id. § 3.
113. Id. § 4.
114. Id. § 5.
115. Id. § 5(b).
116. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1523; Nussbaum & Radice, supra
note 60, at 249. "Me-too" drugs are those drugs which treat the same condition
as a pioneer drug through the same therapeutic mechanism. CBO REPORT,
supra note 46, at 2 box 1.
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though the new products cost 900 [percent] more
than older generic products."'
Specifically, this section would prohibit any person from having
exclusive rights to "manufacture, distribute, sell, or use a drug, a
biological product, or a manufacturing process for a drug or
biological product . . . including the exclusive right to rely on
health registration data . . """ However, this provision also
contains a large exception:
Notwithstanding title 35, United States Code,
relevant provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act [Hatch-Waxman Act] . . . the
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 . . . and any other
provision of law providing any patent right or
exclusive marketing period for any drug, biological
product, or manufacturing process . . . .'1
Instead of rewarding companies with periods of exclusivity to
recoup development costs, the incentive mechanism would be
prize-based, with prizes replacing post-FDA approval
exclusivities.120 In light of the exceptions noted in Section Five,
the bill does not seek to eliminate the patent or FDA system of
exclusivities, but rather provide a separate incentive mechanism by
offering prizes to drug developers.121 Because the bill requires
drug-makers to relinquish exclusivity, competitors would have
greater access to the pioneer's product, and could further improve
or copy the product without fear of infringement. 2 2 This would
not, however, relieve the competitor of the obligation to obtain a
117. Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 60, at 249.
118. S. 1137 §5(a).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1532. H.R. 417 § 4(a) and S. 1137
§ 5(a) are identical.
122. See S. 1137 § 5.
199
17
Park: Extinguishing Exclusive Marketing Rights: Interpreting the Medica
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXII:183
license to use the product, as it most likely would still be under
patent protection.12 3
Sections Six through Eight address funding of the prize system,
as well as general oversight and administration of the system.124
The Bill would create a Board of Trustees comprised of officials
from various regulatory agencies, including the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, the FDA, National Institutes of
Health (NIH), Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and
representatives of the health insurance, biotechnology, and
pharmaceutical industries.125 The Board's primary duties would
entail making findings and presenting these findings to Congress,
such that prizes would be appropriately distributed.'26
Sections Nine through Thirteen provide additional details
regarding budget allocations, eligibility guidelines, identification
of priority research areas, and transitional rules.127 In order to be
eligible for the prize, the person must be the first to (1) receive
FDA approval for a new drug or biological product or (2) obtain a
patent on a new manufacturing process.12 Additionally, as a
means to spur open source knowledge sharing, persons involved in
such collaborative development efforts would also be eligible for a
prize.12 In determining the size of the payout, the bill sets forth
various criteria including: (1) the number of patients who would
benefit from the product or process, including global diseases; (2)
the incremental therapeutic benefit of the product or process as
compared to pre-existing treatments; (3) the degree to which the
product or process addresses priority health care needs such as
global infectious diseases, severe illnesses with small client
populations (i.e. orphan drug classification) and neglected diseases
impacting primarily the poor in developing countries; (4) any
improved efficiency in manufacturing processes; (5) the extent to
which knowledge of the new product or process has been openly
123. Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 170.
124. S. 1137 §§ 6-8.
125. Id. § 7.
126. Id. § 8.
127. Id. §§ 9-13.
128. Id. §9.
129. Id.
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shared; (6) expected life cycle benefits for which drug resistance
remains an obstacle (i.e. antibiotics); and (7) the need to stockpile
against potential future threats. 30 Of these criteria, the Bill gives
special consideration to products that address priority health care
needs, such as the global AIDS pandemic and neglected
diseases.'"' Moreover, in an attempt to promote open-source
development, the Bill also gives special consideration to those
products developed in an open collaborative environment, rather
than maintaining secrecy as is required when pursuing patent
protection.32
As noted above, because companies would be relinquishing
marketing exclusivity, competitors would be free to develop
derivatives of a pioneering product without fear of an infringement
lawsuit. This competition would erode the ability of a pioneer
company to recoup costs over a period of time. In order to protect
the innovators from coat-tail riders who use the pioneer drug as the
basis for a further improvement, Section Nine also allows the
pioneer to continue to receive prize payments for a period of ten
years."' In essence, the bill would maintain the financial incentive
for a period of time roughly matching the current effective patent
term for brand name pharmaceuticals.'3 4 Again, the ongoing prize
payment would offset the decreased revenues associated with
increased competition, and the pioneer would maintain an
incentive to keep developing new products. However, in awarding
prizes, no person would receive more than 5 percent of the total
prize fund in any given year.1
Sections Fourteen through Sixteen establish the creation of an
arbitration procedure for resolving conflicts, the requirement of
130. S. 1137 §9.
131. Id. § 10.
132. Id. § 11. The AIA outlines various bars to patentability, including
knowledge or use of the invention, offers for sale of the invention, and any
printed publication describing the invention prior to filing. AIA, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
133. S. 1137 §§9, 13.
134. See Knocke, supra note 14, at 178.
135. S. 1137 §9.
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annual audits by the General Accounting Office (GAO), and
Congressional reporting requirements. 36
Sections Seventeen and Eighteen provide more details on the
funding of the Prize.' Section Seventeen would authorize budget
appropriations beginning in fiscal year 2013, with the allocation
not to exceed 0.55 percent of that year's GDP.'" In the event that
funds remain after an award cycle, the remainder would revert
back to the Treasury.'39 Section Eighteen represents additional
funding mechanisms.'40 This section would require that "[e]ach
covered entity engaged in the business of providing health
insurance shall pay to the Secretary . . . a fee."' 41 This fee would
be calculated as a percentage of the health insurance company's
(1) net premiums and (2) Federal outlays for reimbursement of
health care costs.'4 2 As defined by this section, a "covered entity"
is any entity providing "health insurance for any United States
health risk."l43
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Proponents and Opponents
As proponents of prize-based incentive systems note, the bill
addresses the major issues confronting drug prices today.'" As
such, an area in which the bill would potentially have the most
dramatic impact would be in the promotion of generic competition.
Under the prize system, because a pioneer company would cede
exclusivity after receiving FDA approval for a new drug, generic
136. Id. §§ 14-16.
137. Id. §§ 17-18.
138. Id. § 17.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 18.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 157, 160; Love & Hubbard,
supra note 17, at 1532
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manufacturers would be able to enter the market immediately. 14 5
While these generics would still have to negotiate licensing
arrangements with the pioneer company,146 the pioneer would be
compelled to grant these licenses, rather than retain exclusive
marketing rights to the product. As seen in the aftermath of Hatch-
Waxman's implementation, allowing generics earlier entry would
indeed stimulate healthy competition, dramatically increasing the
number of products available to the consumer. 147 Consequently,
this would decrease the price of a drug from supra-competitive
monopoly prices to supply and demand driven marginal costs.'4 8
Of course, there will inevitably be opponents. Notably, the
pharmaceutical industry is well-funded and actively engaged in
lobbying efforts, making the passage of legislation directed
towards changing the current system even more difficult.'49 Yet,
the primary argument against implementing a prize system do not
relate to using a prize system per se, but rather with the difficulties
in determining the actual size of the prize.' As noted by one
commentator, "[i]f the prize is too low, then the system will
inadequately stimulate R&D investment. If the prize is too high,
then costs such as resource duplication and favoritism will be
exacerbated.""' Like the bill introduced in 2005, the current
version of the legislation fails to provide details on how the value
of a prize will be determined, instead merely noting that it would
be up to a panel.'52 Because of the lack of predictability in
determining the size of a prize, the participants would not be able
to accurately determine how to allocate resources in pursuit of the
goal.
145. See Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. §
5 (2011).
146. Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 170.
147. Saha, supra note 94, at 17.
148. Id.
149. See Love & Hubbard supra note 9, at 162.
150. Wei, supra note 57, at 32.
151. Wei, supra note 57, at 32.
152. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 8
(2011).
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Another criticism of the prize system is the creation of
inefficiencies.1 3  Because prizes are open to the general public,
there is a high likelihood of multiple parties working towards the
same goal simultaneously, something which the patent system
prevents. 15 4  In the patent system, because a follower knows
exactly what has been patented, he can either design around the
pre-existing invention, or attempt to create something entirely
new. This ensures that resources are directed towards new
developments, rather than towards the same possible solution. Yet
this very duplication of resources can also serve as a source
driving accelerated innovation.'
B. Theoretical Impact of the Medical Innovation Prize Fund
1. Reflecting Competition
In theory, a prize system should effectively de-link R&D and
marketing costs when pricing a new drug.' That is, if one
examines the cost of the generic version of a brand name drug, the
cost is substantially less than the brand name. This is because the
generic does not need to go through the financially taxing process
of discovery, development, and clinical trials before applying for
FDA approval.'" Rather, the generic need only prove that it is the
equivalent to the brand name.' Upon this showing, the generic is
then allowed to rely on the pioneer's clinical trial data.'59 As a
result, the generic does not need to factor in R&D costs into the
ultimate price of the drug, unlike the name brand.' The prize
system seeks to work in a similar manner: the prize itself is meant
to cover the costs of R&D, thus allowing a company to price the
153. Wei, supra note 57, at 39.
154. Id.
155. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 16
(2011).
156. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1534.
157. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 594.
158. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 78, at 594.
159. Id.
160. See CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 3.
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drug independently of such costs. 6' Like the generics that follow,
the brand name drug's price would then theoretically reflect
competitive forces, including supply and demand, and
marketing/sales costs. Moreover, because a pioneer company
could no longer exclusively market its product, generic
competition would be able to enter the market much earlier. 6 2 As
seen in the aftermath of Hatch-Waxman, such competition is quite
effective at driving down the costs of medications.'
2. Addressing the Costs ofFailure
Part of the necessity of exclusivity is to recover the costs of
failure, the costs of clinical trials which do not work and represent
lost money.'64 Pfizer's new product pipeline provides an example
of the high costs of failure. The company has approximately fifty
new molecular entities in its current pipeline.'65 The estimated cost
to develop a single drug is $27 million per year.'66 On a yearly
basis alone, this translates into approximately $1.35 billion.
Multiply this by the six to twelve years it takes to make it through
clinical trials,'17 and the total costs are $8.1 billion. At the current
rate of FDA approval, only about 10 percent (five out of fifty) of
those new drug candidates will actually receive FDA clearance and
161. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 160.
162. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 5
(2011).
163. Saha, supra note 94, at 17-18.
164. Reichman, supra note 41, at 9-10.
165. A large company such as Pfizer has over 50 new molecular entities in
various phases of clinical trials. PFIZER, INC., PFIZER PIPELINE AucUST 2011
(2011), available at http://www.pfizer.com/research/productpipeline/
productpipeline.jsp. A new molecular entity is essentially the equivalent of a
New Chemical Entity, where the active compound has never been used in any
products. See supra note 65. Some of Pfizer's products are also biologics,
which includes a wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and blood
components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and recombinant
therapeutic proteins. Vaccines, Blood & Biologics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
ResourcesforYou/Consumers/default.htm.
166. Adams & Brantner, supra note 39, at 136.
167. Adams & Brantner, supra note 39, at 132.
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generate revenues.168 Consequently, the yearly cost of failure
alone could reach in excess of $1 billion. Considering the sheer
costs involved in developing new molecular entities alone, it is not
surprising that a company like Pfizer would want the ability to
charge monopoly prices. Indeed, at monopoly prices, those
approved drugs could generate revenues in the hundreds of
millions of dollars on an annual basis, if not billions. This revenue
could then be used to cover the cost of the failed drugs. Assuming
a generic version's price to be roughly 50 percent of the branded
version, if the new drug were priced for a competitive market, the
revenues would be cut in half, with a greater proportion of those
revenues going towards R&D failure costs, and decreasing
profitability of the marketed drug. 169
Again, the Bill addresses this concern simply by recognizing
that failure costs are an integral part of R&D costs."' That is,
when a company talks of its R&D costs, it is not talking about the
costs of developing a successful drug only, but also the costs of all
the failed candidates as well."' By offering a prize upwards of $4
billion annually for ten years,'72 the Bill would be able to offset the
costs of failure as part of the R&D expenditures, decreasing the
need for a company to generate blockbuster-type revenues. 173
However, because R&D costs vary between companies, it is
unclear whether the prize would be adequate to completely offset
R&D costs, or just partially offset those costs.
168. Epstein, supra note 42, at 463.
169. Saha, supra note 94, at 22 tbl.1. Prices for generics varies with the
number of competitors in the market, ranging from as little as 30 percent to as
high as 75 percent of the branded product price. Id.
170. See Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. §
2; CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 48.
171. See CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 48.
172. S. 1137 §§ 2, 9.
173. A blockbuster is a drug that generates over $1 billion in revenue in a
given year. Pierre Jacquet, Elizabeth Schwarzbach, Ilan Oren, The New Face of
Blockbuster Drugs, 29 IN Vivo 2, 3 (2011).
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3. Addressing Incremental Improvements
A major criticism of the current patent system revolves around
the incentives to generate incremental improvements to existing
products.'74 This "incentive" becomes stronger when combined
with additional factors, including deadweight loss, the inability to
effectively price discriminate, and the relative inelasticity of
demand in the pharmaceutical market.' As noted earlier,
deadweight losses arise from monopolies because pricing does not
reflect demand."' Because a company can, and will, charge higher
prices than the market would ordinarily support, there will
inevitably be a population which needs a drug, but simply cannot
afford it."' Theoretically, implementing price discrimination
strategies would mitigate such losses: a company would sell a
product at its most profitable price to various segments of the
consumer population."' If one segment could afford higher prices,
the company would charge higher prices to that segment. If
another segment could only afford lower prices, the company
would charge those lower prices. Everyone would pay what they
could afford, and deadweight losses would disappear.
However, price discrimination as a means to reduce deadweight
losses is less effective in pharmaceutical markets."' First, there is
the general issue of accurately assessing what each consumer
segment could pay, a difficult task at best.' Second,
pharmaceutical demand is relatively inelastic."' Unlike other
174. See Nussbaum & Radice, supra note 60, at 249.
175. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 928-29; Love & Hubbard
supra note 17, at 1548-49; Patricia M. Danzon, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1055, 1056 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000).
176. . Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 928-29.
177. Id.
178. Gifford, supra note 18, at 112-13.
179. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1548.
180. Id.
181. See Gifford, supra note 18, at 113 (noting that price discrimination is
effective if the market exhibits elastic demand curves); John A. Vernon, Joseph
H. Golec , W. Keener Hughen, The Economics of Pharmaceutical Price
Regulation and Importation: Refocusing the Debate, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 175,
183 (2006). Elasticity refers to the ability of demand to change depending on
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markets where consumers pay out of pocket for a product,
consumers do not necessarily pay for drugs directly.182 Rather,
drug providers purchase the majority of drugs, and insurance
covers the bulk of the cost.' Perhaps most importantly,
oftentimes spending on drugs is not discretionary: a person who
needs a drug will opt for that drug regardless of price if it is the
only available treatment or perceived to be the most effective
treatment.184 Moreover, in the pharmaceutical market, demand
remains relatively constant regardless of the price.' Because a
company cannot, or need not, effectively price discriminate, it will
continue to charge higher prices than the market would otherwise
support.
Further, the producer does not have to invest nearly as many
resources into a modification, as opposed to a brand new product,
yet still charge supra-competitive prices.' Consequently, the
producer has more of an incentive to merely continue minimally
improving his pre-existing product line.'" "If marketed heavily,
such products can fetch high prices, so long as they are perceived
to be roughly as good as another high-priced medicine."'
Indeed, recent studies have exposed an ongoing decrease in the
development of innovative new pharmaceuticals, with only 8
percent of potential drugs making it through the FDA approval
process.'8 9 Moreover, from the period between 1990 to 2004, only
22 percent of new drug approvals fell under the category of
"priority" review, where the new drug offers a "significant
price at a given output level. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 94 (2d ed. 2000), available at http://www.swleaming.com/
economics/mankiw/principles2e/rep/dl/chO5.pdf.
182. See CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 5.
183. Id.
184. See MANKIW, supra note 180, at 94.
185. See Vernon, supra note 180, at 183; Patricia M. Danzon, The
Pharmaceutical Industry, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1055, 1056
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000).
186. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1523. See Nussbaum & Radice,
supra note 109 (noting that pharmaceutical companies charge upwards of 900%
more for even minor improvements).
187. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1523.
188. Id.
189. Epstein, supra note 42, at 461.
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improvement compared to marketed products in the treatment,
diagnosis, or prevention of a disease."" While some might
consider the incremental improvements acceptable in the face of
having no alternative, the fact remains that "me-too" drugs carry
substantial costs.19 ' This is partially due to the fact that "[o]nce
regulators like the United States FDA determine that products have
few incremental benefits over existing medicines, they are likely to
require more proof that the products don't cause harm to patients.
Companies also need larger trials to claim that small differences in
efficacy are statistically significant." 92
The bill addresses the incremental improvement incentive
provided by patent exclusivity by tying prize sizes to the extent of
improved health outcomes.193 In other words, if a follow-on' 94
product provides only minimal improvements in terms of efficacy,
then the prize would be smaller. Conversely, if the follow-on
product delivered significantly improved efficacy, then the prize
would be proportionally larger. Importantly, the increase, or lack
thereof, in efficacy would be measured against a pre-existing
competing treatment, rather than a placebo.' By tying the size of
the prize to outcomes, the bill would provide an incentive to use a
pioneer drug, and then modify it to make substantial
improvements, rather than merely incremental improvements.
190. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1523 (quoting CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6020.3
(2007)). While some blame the current system for this lack of innovation, other
commentators have noted that previous advances have already addressed
"simpler" diseases, leaving those diseases which have complicated causes, such
as cancer or Alzheimer's. Epstein, supra note 42, at 461-62.
191. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1524.
192. Id.
193. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 9
(2011).
194. A "follow-on" product is one which is derived from the original drug,
and may, or may not, have improved therapeutic properties. Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development: Publications Glossary, TUFTS UNIV. (last visited
Oct. 27, 2011), http://csdd.tufts.edu/library/publicationsglossary. The
difference between a me-too drug and a follow-on is that a me-too targets the
same therapeutic mechanism as the original, but may do so with a compound
unrelated to the original. See CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 2 box 1.
195. Id.
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Further, the bill also provides a level of protection for the pioneer
product.'9 6 By providing upwards of ten years of payments, the
pioneer need not worry about losing its market share to even vastly
improved versions.' Rather, the pioneer would be guaranteed
payment even if competition reduced its market share to zero.198
As a result of tying prizes to improvements, it would redirect R&D
resources away from minimally beneficial changes (in order to
protect market share), to those which have significant impacts on
health outcomes.
However, at first glance, the prize system seems to provide an
incentive to only pursue drugs which have a high probability of
success in clinical trials (i.e. low toxicity with some efficacy
compared to a placebo for FDA approval; improved efficacy
versus a competing drug for the prize). A similar problem to the
incremental improvement of the patent system would arise-the
cost of going into a high-risk clinical trial cannot be economically
justified unless the probability of successful clinical trials and
FDA approval surpasses a certain threshold. Consequently, the
incentive is to introduce only incremental improvements to drugs
with known safety and efficacy profiles in order to mitigate the
risk of new drug development. At some point, the odds of actually
capturing a prize (i.e. being first to FDA approval) would have to
skew significantly in favor of success in order to justify the upfront
costs.
Yet, the above analysis reflects one of the more intriguing
contradictions in innovation. While it would appear that large,
well-established companies would have the knowledge and
resources to engage in expensive innovation projects, a significant
amount of innovation arises from start-up ventures."' Smaller
companies may be willing to spend such high upfront costs in
order to achieve longer-term goals: recognition and reputation.20 0
196. See S. 1137 § 9.
197. S. 1137 § 9; see Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1533.
198. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1533.
199. Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology,
Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 885,
894-95 (2010).
200. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 13
210
28
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss1/6
2011] MEDICAL INNOVATION PRIZE FUND ACT
With increased consumer awareness and goodwill, a small
company creates the potential to grow. Indeed, an analysis of
revenue generation over time, from start-up to well-established
company, typically shows significant losses in the first five to ten
years of existence. 201 In other words, these fledgling companies
and their backing investors are willing to take on significant risks
and the likelihood of many years of red ink to develop a
potentially ground-breaking new therapy or treatment, regardless
of the low probability of success.
Prizes have successfully exploited this high-risk mentality of
innovators and entrepreneurs to propel leaps forward in
technology, at least in the private sector. A prime example of this
came in the form the Ansari X-Prize, offering $10 million to the
first team to develop an aircraft capable of space flight.202
Combined, the participating teams invested over $100 million
dollars of private funds to develop their respective designs.20
Indeed, Paul Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft, reportedly spent
nearly $20 million dollars funding the winning team, twice the
prize award.204 Even though from a rational economics
perspective, the odds of winning the prize compared to the upfront
costs required for development warranted a no-go, the prize was a
resounding success.205 Perhaps even more importantly, the prize
spurred development by numerous competitors, and helped launch
the private sector's space-flight industry.2 06
The legislation proposed would offer a similar incentive: a prize
would be given to the first person to get FDA approval for a new
drug in certain designated categories, such as neglected or global
diseases.207 In theory, the incentive of a prize should spur
innovation by a wide number of entities, not just major life
(2011); see also MCKINSEY & COMPANY, "AND THE WINNER IS ... ": CAPTURING
THE PROMISE OF PHILANTHROPIC PRIZES 19 (2009).
201. CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 46 fig.7.
202. Adler, supra note 198, at 16.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 9
(2011).
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sciences corporations, but also academic researchers. Thus, this
would increase the amount of competition, and ultimately result in
the development of more potential new breakthroughs.
4. Global Health Priorities and Neglected Diseases
The drug industry frequently cites the necessity of exclusivity as
the primary means of recouping upfront investments, without
which there would be no development to begin with.2 08 Thus, the
patent system serves to promote innovation. However, because the
drug industry relies so heavily on monopoly pricing, these
companies have little incentive to invest R&D resources in
minimally profitable drugs, even though there might be a pressing
need.209 The most noteworthy examples arise from diseases
affecting predominantly poor countries, such as malaria.2 10 In
these cases, the population that actually needs the treatment has
little means of affording such treatment. If a drug company goes
ahead and develops a treatment, then it would be unable to charge
prices sufficient to recoup the R&D costs, even with patent
protection in hand.2 11 There is simply no mechanism to reward the
time and effort required for effective new treatments.
Consequently, there is little development geared towards treating
such diseases since "[w]hen marketing exclusivity is the reward,
investors rationally target research investments to address the
problems of patients who have the highest incomes and can pay
the highest prices."1 That is, exclusivity compels an inventor to
develop products which guarantee him a return on investment-
those products for which there is adequate consumer demand. In
the absence of such demand, even the longest period of monopoly
would be useless, as revenue could not be generated in the first
place.
Neglected diseases with small affected populations exhibit a
related shortcoming. Because the affected population is small, the
208. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1616.
209. Love & Hubbard, supra note 17, at 1527.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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potential for large profits decreases unless a company can charge a
price high enough to offset that smaller population.2 13 However,
once that company charges supra-competitive prices, deadweight
losses begin to appear.214 In other words, a company would be able
to charge supra-competitive prices for a neglected disease, but
because of the high price, there will inevitably be a subset of the
population which requires the treatment, but cannot afford it. This
lack of access may arise either because the consumer is uninsured
or underinsured, or because the insurance company will not cover
the costs.2 5 Consequently, the company is not generating optimal
revenues for the product, and the consumer is not receiving
effective treatment. In this case, patent exclusivity itself generates
inefficiencies to the detriment of society.
The proposed prize system would provide an adequate incentive
to engage in programs targeting these neglected and other non-
profitable diseases, be it in the United States with small target
populations, or in foreign countries with populations unable to
afford monopoly-driven prices.2 16 By providing a mechanism to
recoup initial investments, theoretically, companies would be more
willing to engage in R&D targeting these low revenue diseases.
Moreover, because the amount of the prize would be linked to the
population size and the relative impact of the disease, it would be
possible that the prize payout could increase profitability,
especially considering that marketing and sales costs would be
minimal in such areas. 2 17 Here, the prize may provide a sufficient
213. Large pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer are beginning to
recognize the importance of these smaller niche markets. Jonathan D. Rockoff,
Pfizer's Future: The Niche Blockbuster, THE WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2011, at B 1.
As an example, Pfizer's Xalkori treatment for lung cancer is effective in a small
subset of patients with an ALK gene abnormality-only 6,000 patients yearly in
the United States have this lung cancer-associated abnormality. Id. Pfizer is
planning on charging $115,000 per patient per year. Id.
214. Gifford, supra note 18, at 82.
215. Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 157.
216. Gifford, supra note 18, at 86.
217. Theoretically, if the R&D costs remain fixed and covered by prize
awards, and the marketing costs substantially decreased, then the overall
profitability of the drug increases, assuming that manufacturing costs are
minimal.
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incentive to drive increased innovation when compared to
traditional non-profit motivations, such as altruism. 218 Under the
prize system, the "costs" rationale weakens, as the prize award
would be sufficient to cover the drug development costs, thus
providing the much-needed motivation to pursue low-revenue
opportunities.
Additionally, in the author's own estimation, because the target
population is less impacted by marketing efforts, the company
would be able to spend less on the associated marketing costs,
potentially removing a significant cost from the equation. This
removal of marketing costs would provide additional incentive to
pursue such neglected diseases, as profit margins theoretically
would be higher. That is, since the associated costs reflect
primarily R&D and marketing expenditures, with manufacturing
costs contributing minimally, the removal of high marketing costs
decreases the total associated costs. With lower costs, more of the
generated revenue remains unencumbered, resulting in higher
profit margins.
5. The Unpatented and Unpatentable
In certain cases, a new pharmaceutical product may exist in the
absence of a patent, be it because the inventor did not believe it to
be patentable, wanted it in the public domain, or simply failed to
overcome the statutory hurdles for patentability. Whatever the
reason may be, under traditional rationales, the drug has little
chance of extensive development owing to its inability to recover
costs. 2 19 Without patent protection, particularly in the case of small
molecules, as soon as the product became public knowledge, it
would be subject to duplication.220 Owing to the relative ease of
copying small molecules, competitors better situated than the
inventor would be able to engage in the R&D necessary for
218. See Lee, supra note 27, at 682.
219. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 26, at 926-27; Adams & Brantner,
supra note 39, at 131.
220. See CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 3; Moore supra note 47, at 16
(noting that small molecule drugs are structurally simple, making synthesis of
the drug simpler).
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eventual FDA approval.22 1 In this case, the prize system may
provide the necessary financial incentives to continue with
development of the otherwise unpatentable product.
6. Biologicals and Bypassing the Anticommons
Under the anticommons theory of patents, patent holders control
the rights to a scarce resource, and have the ability to exclude
others from using that resource.22 In the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical fields, the anticommons effect appears most
readily when "upstream" research tools are patented, thus
hindering the ability for subsequent researchers to use those tools
for future product development.223
In the rapidly progressing biotechnology field, this is a real
concern.2' Because biotechnology treatments involve the use of
biological molecules (e.g. proteins, RNA and DNA sequences),
these treatments oftentimes involve multiple patentable
components.22 5 Imatinib provides an example of a potential
anticommons effect.2 26 The development of imatinib hinged on the
discovery that a chromosomal fusion causes chronic myeloid
leukemia (CML).227 In this case, the most basic patentable
discoveries would be for the chromosomal fusion of bcr-abl, as
well as for the normal versions of both bcr and abl genes. 2 8
Further, the protein derived from the fusion would be patentable.229
Lastly, any biological compound found to neutralize the effect of
221. See CBO REPORT, supra note 46, at 3.
222. Lee, supra note 27, at 673.
223. Id. at 674. "Upstream" refers to basic research tools and products which
are used to develop the actual finished, or "downstream," products. See Heller
& Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 698.
224. Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1624-25.
225. See Moore, supra note 47, at 16; Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men:
Why an Anticommons Has Not Emerged in the Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 426 (2009).
226. Imatinib (Gleevec) is a tyrosine kinase inhibitor used in the treatment of
various types of cancer, such as chronic myeloid leukemia. Gleevec, NOVARTIS
(last visited Sep. 29, 2011), http://www.gleevec.com.
227. Shiu, supra note 223, at 426.
228. See id.
229. See id.
215
33
Park: Extinguishing Exclusive Marketing Rights: Interpreting the Medica
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XXII:183
the BCR-ABL protein fusion would be patentable.230 If multiple
parties had independently patented the various components
involved in the development of CML, then a potential
anticommons issue could have arisen. 231' That is, if the patent
holder for the bcr gene refused to license his patent, then the
invention of imatinib may not have occurred. Additionally, if
those upstream patent holders did license their patents, they would
expect royalties in return, potentially making downstream
innovation prohibitively expensive.2 32 Moreover, imatinib may
target more enzymes than just BCR-ABL, targets which may
already be patented. The owner of imatinib would have to
negotiate with each of the other target owners simply to test
whether imatinib would be effective against those targets. Again,
further development of imatinib could be blocked by a non-willing
patent owner, or made significantly more expensive if royalties
were necessary for that additional development.
Ultimately, the impact of the bill on alleviating the concerns of
the anticommons in biotechnology depends on the interpretation
and implementation of the bill's exclusivity provisions. In theory,
by compelling owners to relinquish exclusive rights to the various
patents needed to construct an effective final product, the problem
of the anticommons disappears-all parties seeking to utilize those
upstream patents for downstream innovation would have ready
access. However, because the prize system as envisioned still
would require potential interested parties to negotiate licensing
deals with the upstream owners, the issue of compounding fees
making the final product prohibitively expensive would remain.
The prize system does offer a possible workaround to such issues
in the form of collaborative knowledge sharing incentives.233 This
provision would ensure that collaborators deemed necessary to the
development of the final innovation would receive a portion of the
prize fund.234 Because the up-stream innovation oftentimes does
230. See Shiu, supra note 223, at 426.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 11
(2011).
234. S. 1137 § 11.
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not have immediate practical value, but instead a wide range of
future applications (thus generating its value), the innovator
currently has an incentive to patent as early as possible.235 The
innovator knows that the financial rewards will accrue in the form
of licensing royalties even in the absence of such immediate
practical applications as companies "bet" on those future
applications.
By allowing for such upstream innovation to be considered for a
portion of the prize fund, these innovators may be more apt to put
the invention in the public domain. As stated in the bill, "at least 5
percent of the prize payments from the Fund shall be dedicated to
Open Source Dividend prizes."23 6 Again, at current 2010-2011
estimated GDP levels, this would translate into roughly $4 billion
devoted to open source collaborations on a yearly basis.
Ultimately, whether the open-source incentive would work
depends largely on the size of the prize, and the likelihood of
actually winning the prize. For example, academic non-profit
institutions may be more motivated to keep federally-funded
research in the public domain and vie for the prize in adhering to
their traditional purpose: promoting knowledge for the public
good.237 By keeping research in the public domain, it would be
eligible for the prize. But if the prize award were only a one-time
deal, then the appeal of longer-term returns through licensing
might be more attractive. Simply, the prize award must exceed
potential licensing revenues in order to properly incentivize such
open collaboration.
C. Implementation and Interpretation Problems
Despite its seeming ability to create meaningful incentives to
develop innovative new drugs, the actual implementation of the
proposed legislation remains problematic in light of its exceptions
235. This is an example of the prospect theory of patents. See Kitch, supra
note 33; Duffy, supra note 34.
236. S. 1137 § 11.
237. See David C. Hoffman, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access
to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing A Broad Experimental Use
Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 997 (2004).
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to relinquishment of exclusivity. As noted, Section Five provides
exceptions for exclusivities granted by patents or by the FDA.238
Under Section 271 of the Patent Act, the inventor of an invention,
or his assigns, has the right to exclude others from practicing the
invention.2 39 This is the fundamental precept of patents.
Exclusivity is indeed the only right granted under the statute, as
exemplified by the patent owner permanently enjoining infringers
from using the patented product by judicial order. Moreover,
under Hatch-Waxman, the first to receive FDA approval to market
a new molecular entity will receive five years of exclusivity. 24 0 For
new uses of a pre-existing drug, the first person to develop and
receive approval will receive three years of exclusivity.241' FDA
regulations also provide exclusivities for orphan drug and pediatric
drug designations.2 42 Even generics are afforded a period of
exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman of 180 days, provided the
generic prevails in an infringement suit.243
In light of the bill's specific concession to existing statutory
exclusivity, not much is left which would be prone to the Bill's
reach. Essentially every drug in development is currently subject
to patent exclusivity, including incrementally improved versions
and follow-on versions. Because the Bill exempts patent
exclusivity, it would be unable to enforce the relinquishment of
such exclusivity. In other words, assuming that a patented drug
receives FDA approval within its patent term, then the drug-maker
is free to continue to leverage its patent-granted monopoly since
the Bill expressly allows this. Of course, once the drug goes off-
patent, then the drug-maker would have to adhere to the bill's
provisions. However, at that point, the drug-maker no longer has
any right to exclusively market the drug under the patent laws.
Further, if the drug is truly a new molecular entity, it will most
likely be patented and further protected by FDA-granted
238. S. 1137 § 5.
239. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). This section has not been modified by the
AlA. See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
240. Hatch-Waxman, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
241. Id.
242. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b), 360cc
(2006).
243. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 59, at 603; Hatch-Waxman § 101.
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exclusivity. Again, the Bill's exceptions seem to negate its own
purpose of eliminating exclusivity. More importantly, while the
Bill seeks to provide generics with market access almost
immediately after a pioneer drug receives FDA clearance, there is
no provision in the Bill requiring a pioneer to provide competitors
with the information necessary to create an equivalent generic
version of a drug.244 The only way a generic would have access
would be by obtaining the drug commercially, and then reverse-
engineering it-a legitimate exception to patent infringement
under Hatch-Waxman.24 5 Nothing would change about the way
generics gain market entry.
In fact, the Bill would only operate in very limited
circumstances. It would only have an impact if a drug is not
entitled to exclusivity in the first place. That is, there is no
exclusivity if a drug is (1) not patentable; (2) not a new molecular
entity; (3) not an orphan drug; (4) not meant for pediatric use; and
(5) not a successful Paragraph IV generic under Hatch-Waxman.
In these cases, the Bill would have an impact since there would be
no patent-granted or FDA-granted exclusivity. Yet, at best, that
impact would be minimal, restricting the ability of the drug-maker
to negotiate exclusive marketing agreements, something that the
maker is not necessarily entitled to by law.246
Consequently, in order to have any impact whatsoever, one must
interpret the bill as either being (1) voluntary, with a company
opting for prize consideration while relinquishing its right to
244. See Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong.
(2011).
245. The statute states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). See Jeremiah Helm, The Patent End Game:
Evaluating Generic Entry Into a Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Market in the
Absence of FDA Incentives, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 175, 178-79
(2007).
246. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (granting only a right to exclude).
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exclude others or (2) involuntary, as a form of compulsory
licensing, though not necessarily one in which the licensee can use
the patented product without the owner's consent. In both cases,
the awarding of a prize would substitute for patent-granted
exclusivity.
In a voluntary system, a company would develop a new drug
candidate, obtain a patent on the candidate and then pursue a usual
course of drug development: preclinical research and development,
followed by clinical trials and FDA approval.24 7 At this point, the
drug candidate will usually have around five to ten years of
remaining patent life, with the possibility of five additional years
granted under the patent extension provisions of Hatch-Waxman.24 8
If the company opted to compete for a prize, then its ability to
exclude others from developing generic or "me-too" versions of
the drug would be eliminated.249 Moreover, the company would be
required to grant licenses to any competitor asking for access,
though appropriate royalties would still need to be negotiated.250
Presumably, knowing that the company had relinquished
exclusivity, competitors would be able to rely on that company's
own drug data, just as it can under Hatch-Waxman. 251 As a result,
competition would be able to enter the market as soon as the drug
received FDA clearance, thus ensuring that the price of the drug
would reflect competitive supply and demand dynamics, rather
than monopoly pricing power.
However, the primary issue with interpreting it as a voluntary
system would be in its implementation. That is, if a company can
charge supra-competitive prices under patent and FDA exclusivity
rules, and generate annual revenues exceeding several billion
dollars for a blockbuster, then why would a company ever decide
to opt for the prize system? Moreover, if the company knows it
can retain such high pricing on its drug by making even minor
247. See The Drug Development and Approval Process, THE INDEPENDENT
INSTITUTE (last visited Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.fdareview.org/
approvalprocess.shtml.
248. Knocke, supra note 14, at 178; Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 79, at
592; Hatch-Waxman, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 103, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
249. See S. 1137; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
250. Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 170.
251. Hatch-Waxman § 103; Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 79, at 593.
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improvements, is there any reason for the company to even
consider the prize fund, even if it were to receive awards on an
annual basis?
Consider the case of Lipitor, the best-selling cholesterol
reducing medication in the world for the past few years.252
Originally developed and marketed by Warner Lambert and
eventually purchased by Pfizer, Lipitor sales peaked at $12.9
billion in 2006 and remained over $10 billion in 2010.253
Considering the staggering numbers involved, there appears to be
little motivation to pursue a prize capped at $4 billion at current
GDP levels. However, these are total revenues and do not reflect
the costs associated with developing and marketing the drug.254
Companies selling patented drugs tend to engage in extensive
marketing campaigns to develop brand recognition in their
targets.2 55 By doing so, the company seeks to maximize revenues
and profits during its period of exclusivity. At the same time, the
final price of the drug ultimately reflects these increased marketing
expenses. An examination of Pfizer's financial reports suggest
that R&D accounts for only 15 percent of costs, and marketing
expenses account for upwards of 30 percent. 256 A report by the
Congressional Budget Office also noted that pharmaceutical
companies spent approximately $4.7 billion, or one quarter of their
promotional expenditures, on direct-to-consumer advertising in
252. Pharmaceutical Sales, DRUGS.COM (last visited Oct. 27, 2011),
http://www.drugs.com/top200.html. Pfizer is not necessarily representative of
all pharmaceutical companies, as 70 percent of its revenues were derived from
blockbuster drugs. Jacquet supra note 172, at 2.
253. PFIZER INC., 2008 FINANCIAL REVIEW 21 (2008), available at
http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualreport/2008/financial/financial2008.pdf;
PFIZER INC., 2010 FINANCIAL REVIEw 25 (2010), available at
http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualreport/20 10/financial/financial2010.pdf.
254. See PFIZER INC., supra note 251 (financial reports display total
revenues, and then subtract costs to determine profits).
255. Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 159.
256. PFIZER INC., 2010 FINANCIAL REVIEW 25 (2010). Note that these are at
best rough estimates of costs associated for any given product since companies
do not list costs on an individual product basis, only as a whole. Id.
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2008.257 The other $20.5 billion was spent on promotions directed
at doctors and other health care professionals.2 58
Because of the incentives provided by the prize system,
marketing costs could be significantly reduced, thus decreasing the
overall costs associated with a drug. That is, the necessity to
expend large amounts for marketing purposes would be somewhat
attenuated, as marketing costs would have to be proportional to the
competitively determined price of the drug. Under the patent
system, a company can charge supra-competitive prices, and
because revenues are higher, can devote more resources to
marketing. Moreover, because the company would want to
generate strong brand-loyalty or recognition prior to patent
expiration, it would have additional motivation to engage in
extensive marketing campaigns.259 While marketing would remain
an important aspect even in a competitive system, overall
marketing expenses would be reined in because of price and
competition pressures.260 Since the pioneer company would be
charging substantially less in the absence of monopoly-power, it
would be able to devote only a smaller portion to marketing.
Because there is a reduction in overall costs, a drug-maker could
achieve a similar level of profitability for a given drug under the
prize system as under the patent system.
As a simple example, assume that a patented drug generates
$100. $15 of that revenue would go towards R&D expenses,
another $30 towards marketing expenses, and another $30 towards
other administrative expenses. This would leave $25 as profit, or a
25 percent profit. The same drug under the Bill's provisions
would cost substantially less, say $50. Assuming that R&D and
other costs can be reduced slightly to $10 and $20 respectively, the
remaining $20 would have to cover both marketing costs and
profits. Thus, if a company wanted to maintain a 25 percent profit
257. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A BAN ON DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF NEW PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (2011).
258. Id. at 2.
259. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 159.
260. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING ON PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS 7 (2009) (noting that companies spend less on promotional activities in
markets with larger numbers of competitors).
222
40
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss1/6
2011] MEDICAL INNOVATION PRIZE FUND ACT
($12.50), it would have to reduce marketing to 15 percent of
revenues ($7.50). Conversely, the company could maintain
aggressive marketing practices, but expect significantly reduced
net profits. If 30 percent of revenue ($15 out of $50) remained
devoted to marketing, then total costs would equal $45, leaving
only $5 profit, or 10 percent. While the Bill provides an incentive
to decrease marketing expenses, ultimately the decision on
profitability rests with a company's individual business strategy.
Under a non-voluntary system, a similar conclusion ultimately
will be reached as under the voluntary adoption of the prize route.
However, rather than the company voluntarily licensing its
product, the bill could be interpreted as creating a form of
compulsory licensing of any patented product. In light of the bill's
deference to the patent laws and FDA-granted exclusivity, the only
way to co-exist with these statutory grants of monopoly would be
to interpret the bill as requiring compulsory licenses. Because the
relinquishment of exclusivity post-FDA approval would be
mandatory, it would ensure that all companies with patented drugs
would go through the prize system.
Compulsory licensing is not unprecedented, as seen in both
domestic regulation as well as through international accord.26 ' In
the United States, the government is permitted to grant itself, and
others, a license to use a patented product without the permission
of the owner under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, usually due to national
emergency (e.g. disease outbreaks).262 Other statutes contain
provisions explicitly allowing for compulsory licensing if needed
for the greater public good, thus overriding patent exclusivity. 263
261. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) contains provisions allowing for compulsory licensing so long
as there is sufficient remuneration, and the need for the patented product greatly
impacts the public good. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to
Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt
Innovation? 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 869-72 (2003).
262. Id. at 863.
263. For example, the Atomic Energy Act compulsory licensing provisions
reads in part
Whenever any patent has been declared affected with the
public interest . . . any person may apply to the Commission
for a nonexclusive patent license to use the invention or
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However, the proposed legislation does not contain equivalent
provisions.264 As such, it is difficult to determine exactly how the
Bill would implement and enforce a compulsory licensing scheme.
Additionally, owing to the considerable political strength of the
pharmaceutical industry, it is unlikely that the industry would react
favorably to such a scheme.265
D. Possible Solutions
While in theory, a prize system appears to be an effective tool
both to drive innovation and to drive down costs through
competition, the Bill as presented lacks the substance to be truly
effective. As noted, in light of the exceptions to patent and FDA-
granted exclusivity, there are precious few other forms of
exclusivities impacted by the Bill. Because of this, the majority of
pharmaceutical companies would still rely on patent protection and
FDA-granted exclusivity to continue charging supra-competitive
prices. Moreover, as these companies would not be required to
relinquish exclusivity, any subsequent generic manufacturers
would still have to wait until the original patent expired before
entering the market.2 6 Alternatively, the generic maker would still
have to utilize Hatch-Waxman's Paragraph IV provision, allowing
the generic maker to duplicate a pioneer's drug and prove non-
infringement in court.267
discovery covered by such patent, and the Commission shall
grant such patent license to the extent that it finds that the use
of the invention or discovery is of primary importance to the
conduct of an activity by such person authorized under this
chapter.
Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents Under
CERCLA? 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 397, 401-03, n.21 (1994) (quoting
Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954)).
264. See Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2011, S. 1137, 112th Cong.
(2011).
265. Love & Hubbard, supra note 9, at 173.
266. See S. 1137; Hatch-Waxman, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984).
267. Hatch-Waxman § 101.
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To make the Bill more effective, some clarity is necessary.
Most importantly, it must clearly define how the exclusivity
elimination would operate in light of its exceptions. By its terms,
does the Bill leave all patent-granted exclusivities in place? Or
would it operate along the lines of a compulsory licensing system?
Would it be a voluntary system with participants willingly
foregoing exclusivity in exchange for a piece of the prize? In
order to ease the impact on the health care industry, a voluntary
system might be in order. While larger, well-established
companies may continue to rely on patent and FDA-granted
exclusivity, smaller companies and investors may be more willing
to forego the traditional system in favor of a guaranteed payout
over ten years. The prospect of guaranteed returns would be even
more appealing if the company lacks a strong brand-awareness, or
the marketing muscle of its established competitors. If the system
were mandatory, then the easiest fix to clarify the Bill would be to
introduce a provision similar to the Atomic Energy Act.2 68 This
would allow the government to compel non-exclusive licenses for
those priority areas defined in the Bill.
Additionally, the Bill needs to clearly define the size of the
prize. As opponents note, one of the Bill's flaws rests with the
uncertainty of prize sizes.269 This uncertainty means participants
would not know what a reasonable investment would be. While
some might consider a $20 million initial investment reasonable
for a $10 million prize, would the same investment still be
reasonable if it were only a $1 million prize? From the outset, the
prize amounts must be clearly noted. Considering that companies
routinely estimate revenues for their products on both domestic
and international scales, input from established pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industry players would be a logical first step in
determining the size of individual prizes.
Ultimately, however, making a prediction on the value of any
given new treatment will be exceedingly difficult, owing to the
complex nature of diseases and disorders. This is precisely why
the patent system's free-market approach is a far more efficient
determinant of value. Under the patent system, the public will
268. Nunnenkamp, supra note 261, at n.21.
269. Wei, supra note 57, at 32.
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"reward" an invention based on its perceived necessity. The
bigger the demand, the bigger the reward, and vice versa.
If the Bill were to pass, its most immediate impact would likely
be in the areas of the aforementioned neglected/orphan diseases
with small populations and global diseases with low profitability.
For neglected/orphan diseases, because the population is so small,
the ability to generate sufficient revenue to offset costs diminishes.
Consequently, a company would have to charge higher prices to
offset the smaller population. If the Bill were to pass, then
companies would no longer have to worry about recouping R&D
costs, as the prize would ideally be sufficient to cover such costs.
As a result, those companies would be able to charge lower prices,
and still generate adequate profits. Moreover, since the price is
more manageable, the extent of deadweight loss also diminishes.
A similar scenario plays out for global diseases primarily
afflicting poor populations. Because the prize would cover a
substantial portion of a drug's costs, a company would no longer
have to worry about recovering those costs. The result would be a
decrease in price at the outset. Couple the decreased costs with
increased competition and the final price of a drug decreases even
further. The end result in both scenarios is the same: both social
benefits and revenues approach maximal levels.
V. CONCLUSION
High prescription drug prices continue to pose a problem for the
health care system in the United States. While pharmaceutical
companies may be justified in charging higher prices to offset
R&D and clinical trial costs, the fact that they continue to charge
high prices for even minor incremental improvements remains
problematic. The proposed legislation is a strong attempt at
addressing several of the underlying structural issues of high drug
costs. From a fundamental economic perspective, de-linking R&D
costs from the final price of a drug while simultaneously
promoting generic competition would serve to drive down costs
considerably. However, the economic backdrop is far more
complex considering the involvement of private and public health
insurance, and drug provider organizations. While it seems
unlikely that this Bill will pass, it does help keep the issue at the
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top of the healthcare debate. Perhaps some express guidelines
regarding the Bill's implementation-voluntary or compulsory-
along with clarification on the determination of prize sizes would
ease its acceptance.
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